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INTRODUCTION
Over the last century, humans have warmed the planet by ap-
proximately 1.0°C.1 Pennsylvania’s average temperature has risen
1.8°F in the last hundred years, and climate scientists predict it will
warm an additional 5.4°F by 2050.2 These rising temperatures
create feedback loops, leading to warming that will eventually
become irreversible.3 Warmer temperatures have already led to
melting ice caps, rising sea levels, dangerous weather patterns, and
food shortages.4 Human-produced greenhouse gases (GHG) are the
largest contributing factor to this warming.5 The scientific commu-
nity largely agrees that if humans do not reach carbon neutrality by
2050, damage to the climate will be irreparable.6 Beyond that point,
it will be nearly impossible for humans to mitigate, let alone pre-
vent, the worst of climate change’s impacts on the planet.7
For at least the last decade, scientists and environmental
organizations have emphasized the need to take protective mea-
sures against climate change and have provided actionable steps
1. See generally Myles R. Allen, Opha Pauline Dube, William Solecki, Fernando Aragón-
Durand, Wolfgang Cramer, Stephen Humphreys, Mikiko Kainuma, Jatin Kala, Natalie
Mahowald, Yacob Mulugetta, Rosa Perez, Morgan Wairiu & Kirsten Zickfeld, Framing and
Context, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 C, at 59 (Valérie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., 2018),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_Chapter1_Low-Res.pdf [https://
perma.cc/SVK8-9ZPS]; Joeri Rogelj, Drew Shindell, Kejun Jiang, Solomone Fifita, Piers
Forster, Veronika Ginzburg, Collins Handa, Haroon Kheshgi, Shigeki Kobayashi, Elmar
Kriegler, Luis Mundaca, Roland Séférian & Maria Virginia Vilariño, Mitigation Pathways
Compatible with 1.5°C in the Context of Sustainable Development, in GLOBAL WARMING OF
1.5°C, supra, at 93, https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/chapter/chapter-2/ [https://perma.cc/H4GS-
QLLP].
2. Climate Change in PA, PA. DEP’T OF ENV’T PROT., http://www.depgis.state.pa.us/
ClimateChange/index.html [https://perma.cc/APU3-5KB2].
3. Susan Solomon, Gian-Kasper Plattner, Reto Knutti & Pierre Friedlingstein, Irrevers-
ible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 PROC.NAT’LACAD.SCIS.U.S. 1704,
1705 (2009).
4. See id. at 1704.
5. Benjamin T. Sharp, Stepping into the Breach: State Constitutions as a Vehicle for
Advancing Rights-Based Climate Litigation, 14 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 39,
40 (2019).
6. Rogelj et al., supra note 1, at 95; see also Solomon et al., supra note 3, at 1704.
7. See, e.g., Robert B. McKinstry, Jr. & John C. Dernbach, Applying the Pennsylvania
Environmental Rights Amendment Meaningfully to Climate Disruption, 8 MICH. J. ENV’T &
ADMIN. L. 49, 64-65 (2018).
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for governments at every level.8 Above all, these groups have
stressed the importance of reducing carbon emissions and have pro-
posed guidelines to achieve that goal.9 These strategies include
transitioning energy sources and industries to greener practices,
investing in sustainable infrastructure and agricultural systems,
and climate finance and carbon pricing programs.10 Some countries
have taken these proposals seriously and implemented significant
policies and legislation to combat climate change.11
The United States, particularly at the federal level, has ignored
many of these recommendations for combatting climate change.12
Despite intense lobbying efforts and growing public support,
Congress has failed to enact meaningful climate legislation.13 In
recent years, the executive branch has rolled back many protective
regulations.14 Constitutional jurisdiction requirements and the
8. See, e.g., Climate Action Summit 2019, Report of the Secretary-General on the 2019
Climate Action Summit and the Way Forward in 2020, at 6-7 (Dec. 11, 2019) [hereinafter
Climate Action Summit 2019], http://sdghelpdesk.unescap.org/sites/default/files/2020-
06/cas_report_11_dec.pdf [https://perma.cc/N435-KVXX].
9. See Mark Szybist & Amanda Levin, PA Needs CO2 Limits—and Strong Renewables
Policy, Too, NRDC (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/mark-szybist/pa-needs-
renewable-energy-goals-well-carbon-limits [https://perma.cc/U4A8-CUY2].
10. See, e.g., Climate Action Summit 2019, supra note 8, at 6-7.
11. Julia Rosen, Here’s How 6 Countries Are Stepping Up to Meet the Paris Climate Goals,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/environment/story/2019-09-
22/how-countries-are-meeting-climate-change-goals [https://perma.cc/EA37-7MB5]. 
12. See, e.g., Umair Irfan, The House Just Passed Its First Climate Bill in a Decade, VOX
(May 2, 2019, 1:41 PM), https://www.vox.com/2019/3/27/18283831/pelosi-climate-change-
green-new-deal [https://perma.cc/U4BT-AJL7]; Climate Action Now Act, H.R. 9, 116th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2019) (as passed by House, May 2, 2019) (the bill was placed on the Senate’s
legislative calendar in May 2019 and has not been addressed since); Nadja Popovich, Livia
Albeck-Ripka & Kendra Pierre-Louis, The Trump Administration Is Reversing 100 Envi-
ronmental Rules. Here’s the Full List., N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2020/climate/trump-environment-rollbacks.html [https://perma.cc/Y9Z4-DY6B].
13. See, e.g., Amber Phillips, Congress’s Long History of Doing Nothing on Climate
Change, in 6 Acts, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2015, 11:15 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-fix/wp/2015/12/01/congresss-long-history-of-inaction-on-climate-change-in-6-parts/
[https://perma.cc/Z8GT-6NU5] (providing a timeline of Congress’s few, and largely ineffective,
attempts at climate regulation between 1990 and 2015).
14. See, e.g., Popovich et al., supra note 12; Sharp, supra note 5, at 41-42. However, the
Biden-Harris administration seems to appreciate the existential threat posed by climate
change and has committed to tackling the crisis head-on. See, e.g., The Biden-Harris
Administration Immediate Priorities, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/priorities
[https://perma.cc/58SA-RBDA]. For a discussion of the kinds of steps climate experts believe
the Biden-Harris administration will need to take to adequately fight climate change, see
generally Thomas Hale & Nathan Hultman, ‘All In’ Climate Diplomacy: How a Biden-Harris
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federal judiciary’s reluctance to recognize environmental rights
have thus far posed insurmountable barriers to rights-based climate
litigation.15
In light of these challenges at the federal level and the dwindling
time remaining to correct course, states, with fewer threshold
barriers posed by jurisdictional requirements, are an increasingly
attractive forum for enforcing environmental rights.16 At the state
level, officials can enact, implement, reinterpret, and amend
policies, legislation, and constitutional provisions more quickly and
with more flexibility than their federal counterparts.17 States,
particularly in recent years, have taken advantage of that flex-
ibility.18 As of 2011, twenty-two states have constitutional provi-
sions that protect environmental concerns either as a civil right or
as a general policy matter.19 Despite these amendments, enforcing
environmental rights has proven challenging in many states.20
In 1971, Pennsylvanians voted to ratify the Environmental Rights
Amendment (ERA) in Article I, Section 27 of the Commonwealth’s
constitution.21 Unlike other states, Pennsylvania enumerates envi-
ronmental protections in its Declaration of Rights, placing them
alongside other fundamental rights, such as the freedom of speech
Administration Can Leverage City, State, Business and Community Climate Action (Glob.
Econ. and Dev. at Brookings, Global Working Paper No. 147, 2020), https://www.brookings.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/All-in-climate-diplomacy_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QUD-
V2L6].
15. See, e.g., Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1175 (9th Cir. 2020) (“That the other
branches may have abdicated their responsibility to remediate the problem does not confer
on Article III courts, no matter how well-intentioned, the ability to step into their shoes.”).
16. See Sharp, supra note 5, at 44.
17. See JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16-19 (2018).
18. See Jack R. Tuholske, U.S. State Constitutions and Environmental Protection:
Diamonds in the Rough, 21 WIDENER L. REV. 239, 240 (2015); see also Brad Plumer, Blue
States Roll Out Aggressive Climate Strategies. Red States Keep to the Sidelines., N.Y. TIMES
(June 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/climate/states-climate-change.html
[https://perma.cc/S9TD-R6DD].
19. James R. May & William Romanowicz, Environmental Rights in State Constitutions,
in PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 305, 306, 315-21 (James R. May ed.,
2011).
20. Lynda L. Butler, State Environmental Programs: A Study in Political Influence and
Regulatory Failure, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 847 (1990).
21. Franklin L. Kury, The Environmental Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution:
Twenty Years Later and Largely Untested, 1 VILL. ENV’T L.J. 123, 123-24 (1990).
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and religion.22 Despite this elevation, early decisions from the
Pennsylvania courts severely limited the ERA’s power.23 However,
Pennsylvania courts have recently construed section 27 to protect
Pennsylvanians’ environmental rights and impose certain duties on
the Commonwealth.24 Pennsylvania’s ERA jurisprudence offers
helpful legal principles that other states can tailor to their own con-
stitutional frameworks to address climate change at a subnational
level.
In October of 2019, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf signed
Executive Order 2019-07, which directed the Commonwealth’s
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) to produce a plan
by July 2020 to reduce Pennsylvania’s carbon emissions by either
joining the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a green-
house gas cap and trade program, or establishing its own carbon
emission reduction scheme.25 As participants in RGGI’s cap and
trade system, nine states in the Northeast and mid-Atlantic region
limit GHG emissions by selling carbon allowances in quarterly
auctions, the proceeds of which are returned to participating
states.26 In early 2020, the DEP presented its preliminary proposal
22. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27; see also Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF), 161
A.3d 911, 918 (Pa. 2017) (“The decision to affirm the people’s environmental rights in a
Declaration or Bill of Rights, alongside political rights, is relatively rare in American
constitutional law.”).
23. John C. Dernbach, Kenneth T. Kristl & James R. May, Recognition of Environmental
Rights for Pennsylvania Citizens: Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 803, 810-12 (2018).
24. See PEDF, 161 A.3d at 934-36.
25. Pa. Exec. Order No. 2019-07 (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.governor.pa.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2019/10/Executive-Order-2019-07-Commonwealth-Leadership-in-Addressing-
Climate-Change-through-Electric-Sector-Emissions-Reductions.pdf [https://perma.cc/CD2X-
PWCL]. For a detailed look at cap and trade policies and RGGI, see How Cap and Trade
Works, ENV’T DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.org/climate/how-cap-and-trade-works [https://
perma.cc/BYV4-Q9LR]; infra Part III. In September of 2020, the Environmental Quality
Board voted to initiate the public comment period, which runs from November 7, 2020,
through January 14, 2021. Mandy Warner, Pennsylvanians, Make Your Voice Heard on a
Major Climate Rulemaking, ENV’T DEF. FUND (Nov. 9, 2020), http://blogs.edf.org/climate411/
2020/11/09/pennsylvanians-make-your-voice-heard-on-a-major-climate-rulemaking/ [https://
perma.cc/EJ2M-97Y3]; Public Participation in the Regulatory Process, ENV’T QUALITY BD.,
https://www.dep.pa.gov/PublicParticipation/EnvironmentalQuality/Pages/default.aspx [https://
perma.cc/9HGV-Y2P4].
26. Bruce Ho, The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Is a Model for the Nation, NRDC
(Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.nrdc.org/resources/regional-greenhouse-gas-initiative-model-
nation [https://perma.cc/3ES2-TX28].
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for implementing a cap and trade program and has since continued
through the regulatory rulemaking process.27 Despite this progress,
the Commonwealth has not yet articulated how it will use the funds
generated from RGGI’s allowance auctions.28 This Note argues that
the Commonwealth not only has a duty to combat climate change by
reducing carbon emissions but also has a duty under the ERA to
invest the funds it earns through carbon allowance auctions into the
conservation and protection of Pennsylvania’s environment.
Part I examines the ERA’s purpose and early history. Part II
analyzes recent court decisions that have established both the con-
tours of Pennsylvanians’ environmental rights and the Common-
wealth’s duties under the ERA. Part III explains the functionality
of cap and trade systems generally and how RGGI currently
operates. Part IV discusses how the Commonwealth’s duties under
the ERA inform the administration of a cap and trade program and
how Pennsylvania courts can enforce the fulfillment of those duties.
Part V anticipates and addresses potential counterarguments
regarding enforcement in light of separation of powers concerns and
the sufficiency of RGGI in fulfilling the Commonwealth’s duties.
I. GOING GREEN: THE HISTORY OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT
For a commonwealth named after its woods, Pennsylvania has a
long record of abusing its natural resources.29 The Commonwealth’s
history of environmental mistreatment from the eighteenth through
the mid-twentieth centuries has been summarized as follows: “We
seared and scarred our once ... pleasant land with mining opera-
tions. We polluted our rivers.... We poisoned our ‘delicate, pleasant
and wholesome’ air ... with the fumes of millions of automobiles....
27. HAYLEY L. BOOK, PA. DEP’T OF ENV’T PROT., PENNSYLVANIA’S PROPOSED CO2 BUDGET




28. See, e.g., McKinstry & Dernbach, supra note 7, at 108; Mark Szybist, Governor Wolf
Says PA Will Join RGGI. Now What?, NRDC (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/
mark-szybist/governor-wolf-moving-forward-rggi-what-now [https://perma.cc/FAZ3-PRK4].
29. Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 960 (Pa. 2013).
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We uglified our land and we called it progress.”30 This Part provides
a brief history of the ERA’s ratification and early court decisions
that marked a departure from the intended purpose of the amend-
ment.
In 1971, the Pennsylvania General Assembly amended the Com-
monwealth’s Declaration of Rights to add section 27, which states:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values
of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are
the common property of all the people, including generations yet
to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.31
Proponents introduced the amendment on the first Earth Day, April
14, 1970, as part of a movement toward environmental awareness
and protection.32 Both houses of the General Assembly passed the
amendment unanimously in 1971 and Pennsylvanians overwhelm-
ingly voted in support of it in a referendum that spring.33 With this
amendment, advocates intended to give Pennsylvanians a constitu-
tional basis to object to environmental abuse and to “force those who
would adversely affect the environment to consider the impact of
their actions before acting.”34
However, early judicial decisions in ERA cases departed from
both the ERA’s text and purpose.35 In Payne v. Kassab, the Pennsyl-
vania Commonwealth Court established a test that set a low bar for
adherence to the ERA and had little to do with the actual text of the
amendment.36 The analysis only required compliance with applica-
ble regulations and legislation designed to protect the environment,
a showing of “reasonable effort to reduce” environmental impact,
30. Id. at 961 (quoting PA. H. JOURNAL 2270 (1970)).
31. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27; see Kury, supra note 21, at 123-24.
32. Kury, supra note 21, at 123.
33. Id. at 123-24.
34. Id. at 124.
35. See Commonwealth v. Nat’l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 302 A.2d 886, 894-95
(Pa. Commw. Ct.), aff’d, 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973) (holding that the construction of a tower
overlooking the Gettysburg Battlefield did not violate the ERA); Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d
86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), aff’d, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976) (establishing a weak three-
pronged standard that did little to protect environmental interests).
36. See Payne, 312 A.2d at 94.
2021] GREENING THE TRUST 1699
and a demonstration that the benefits from the action outweigh the
environmental harm.37 At first blush, the language of the analysis
suggests that the test would provide robust protection for the
environment. In reality, however, Payne did little to defend either
the commonwealth’s natural resources or Pennsylvanians’ environ-
mental rights.38 The Payne test remained the standard of review for
government action under the ERA for over four decades.39 In that
time, only one case successfully raised a section 27 challenge.40
II. CONTOURS OF SECTION 27: DEFINING RIGHTS AND DUTIES
UNDER THE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
For the forty years following Payne, adherence to section 27
required minimal environmental considerations.41 Only in 2013 did
courts begin to enforce the ERA with the kind of force the amend-
ment’s drafters originally intended.42 Section A reviews the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s analyses of the ERA’s text in
Robinson Township v. Commonwealth and Pennsylvania Environ-
mental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth (PEDF ). In both
cases, the court articulated the scope of individual environmental
rights and defined the duties imposed on the Commonwealth.
Section B explains how the principles and analyses developed in
those cases implicate a duty on the Commonwealth to combat
climate change.
37. Id.
38. John C. Dernbach & Marc Prokopchak, Recognition of Environmental Rights for
Pennsylvania Citizens: A Tribute to Chief Judge Castille, 53 DUQ. L. REV. 335, 344 (2015) (“In
the overwhelming majority of reported court cases ... individuals or organizations seeking
vindication of their environmental rights lost.”).
39. Id.
40. Id.; see Marcon, Inc. v. Pa. Dep’t of Env’t Res., 462 A.2d 969, 971-72 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1983) (holding that the denial of a permit was proper because the proposed development fail-
ed the Payne test).
41. See, e.g., Payne, 312 A.2d at 94 (widening a road and reducing a public park’s acreage
did not violate section 27); Commonwealth v. Nat’l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311
A.2d 588, 594-95 (Pa. 1973) (building a tower near Gettysburg Battlefield did not violate
section 27); Pa. Env’t Mgmt. Servs. v. Pa. Dept. of Env’t Res., 503 A.2d 477, 480 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1986) (holding that under section 27, a municipal waste landfill permit should not be
denied even though it failed to protect against leachate discharge into a nearby stream).
42. Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 950 (Pa. 2013).
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A. Return to the ERA’s Text in Robinson Township and
Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation
In both Robinson Township and PEDF, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court revived the ERA and clarified the rights and duties
the amendment establishes.43 Recognizing that Payne had led ERA
case law astray, the court emphasized the importance of correcting
course by reanalyzing the amendment’s text.44 To better understand
the ERA’s language, both courts looked to “the occasion and neces-
sity for the provision; ... the mischief to be remedied;” and “the
object to be attained.”45
1. Robinson Township: Reviving the ERA
In Robinson Township, a plurality of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court challenged the Payne test for the first time.46 The case
centered on amendments to the Oil and Gas Act, which regulated
production of those resources.47 In 2012, Governor Tom Corbett
enacted several laws that promoted alternative gas development
methods and limited local governments’ ability to regulate
fracking.48
In deciding whether the modifications violated the constitution,
the court interpreted each of the ERA’s three provisions.49 Through
its analysis, the court provided new interpretive guidelines,
established the contours of Pennsylvanians’ environmental rights,
and defined the Commonwealth’s duties.50 Under section 27, the
43. Id. at 913; Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth (PEDF ), 161 A.3d 911, 916 (Pa.
2017).
44. Robinson Township, 83 A.3d at 946 (describing how the Payne decision “obscured the
manifest intent of [section 27] as expressed in its plain language” (citing Holt v. Legis.
Reapportionment Comm’n, 38 A.3d 711, 759 n.38 (Pa. 2012))).
45. Id. at 945 (citations omitted).
46. Id. at 913.
47. Id. at 915.
48. Id. Extraction of these resources typically requires drilling vertically to access pools
of oil or gas. Id. However, to reach the abundance of natural gas located in the Marcellus
Formation, the largest shale strata in the Commonwealth, companies had to use alternative
mining techniques, including hydrofracturing, which drastically changed the landscapes
where it was used. Dernbach & Prokopchak, supra note 38, at 351-52.
49. Robinson Township, 83 A.3d at 951-59.
50. Id.
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Commonwealth must prevent both direct and indirect harm to the
people’s environmental rights, prohibit direct and indirect harm to
Pennsylvania’s natural resources, and act affirmatively through
legislation to protect environmental rights.51
Significantly, the court did not define the particular steps nec-
essary to preserve and maintain the environment.52 The court
simply instructed that the phrase “conserve and maintain impli-
cates a duty to prevent and remedy the degradation, diminution, or
depletion of ” the environment and natural resources.53 Accordingly,
the Commonwealth must determine how best to fulfill that duty, so
long as its discretion comports with the purpose of the ERA.54 The
court also emphasized that section 27 was not intended to prohibit
all development or give such weight to environmental concerns that
they per se outweigh other interests.55 Rather, the amendment
instructs that those interests cannot come at the unreasonable
expense of the environment.56
The court stressed that the amendment’s language should not be
construed to narrow its scope.57 Thus, while section 27 specifically
lists several natural elements to which Pennsylvanians have a
constitutional right, the text “implicates a holistic analytical ap-
proach” and protects aspects of the environment not specifically
enumerated in the text.58 The court further emphasized that the
breadth of protection could expand over time, especially in light of
changing “legal and societal concerns.”59
From the first clause of section 27, the court drew an implied duty
that requires the Commonwealth, at all levels, to consider how its
actions affect the air, water, and other environmental values.60
While the first clause, which establishes the people’s environmental
rights, does not explicitly impose a duty on the Commonwealth,61
51. Id. at 951-52, 957-58.
52. Id. at 957.
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 958.
56. Id. at 954.
57. Id. at 955.
58. Id. at 951.
59. Id. at 955.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 913 (“The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation
of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.” (quoting PA. CONST.
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“the right articulated [therein] is neither meaningless nor merely
aspirational.”62 Thus, the government’s analysis for any project
must weigh its impact, both in the long- and short-term, on the envi-
ronment.63 Based on that analysis, any actions “that unreasonably
impair the right [to a clean environment] are unconstitutional.”64
The trustee-beneficiary relationship, established in clauses two
and three,65 imposes the Commonwealth’s second duty.66 The
Commonwealth must “refrain from permitting or encouraging the
degradation, diminution, or depletion of public natural resources.”67
This “prohibitory” duty applies both when state action directly
depletes the resources and when state inaction indirectly allows the
same.68
As trustee, the Commonwealth has a third duty, also drawn from
clauses two and three, “to act affirmatively to protect the environ-
ment, via legislative action.”69 The court emphasized the importance
of legislation to specify and allocate responsibilities, provide stan-
dards, and help manage logistical issues that arise with imple-
menting and executing environmental protections.70 In articulating
this duty, the court did not dictate the type of legislation to be
passed; it simply instructed that the General Assembly would need
to pass legislation on environmental issues.71 The court made clear,
however, that the amendment was self-executing and that no
additional legislation was necessary to “confer[ ]” its rights and
duties.72 Through this decision, the court took a critical step in
art. 1, § 27)). 
62. Id. at 952.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 951.
65. Id. at 913 (“Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all
the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Common-
wealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.” (quoting PA.
CONST. art. 1, § 27)).
66. Id. at 957.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 958 (citing Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1896)).
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. Id. (“[A]dministrative details are appropriately addressed by legislation.... The call for
complementary legislation, however, does not override the otherwise plain conferral of rights
upon the people.” (footnote omitted) (citing Jose L. Fernandez, State Constitutions, Environ-
mental Rights Provisions, and the Doctrine of Self-Execution: A Political Question?, 17 HARV.
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breathing new life into the ERA. By defining the contours of section
27, the court provided citizens with a meaningful weapon with
which they could enforce their environmental rights.
2. Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation: Defining
the Commonwealth’s Duties as Trustee
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 2017 Pennsylvania Environ-
mental Defense Foundation (PEDF ) decision cemented the analysis
put forward in Robinson Township and elaborated on the Common-
wealth’s duties as a trustee.73 The case centered on legislation
directing payments made to the Commonwealth’s General Fund in
consideration for access to oil and gas on public lands.74 Typically,
proceeds earned through leasing state-owned lands were required
to go toward preserving natural resources within the Common-
wealth.75 However, legislation passed in 2009 limited the amount of
money that could go to such projects and diverted the rest of the
funds toward projects unrelated, and often in direct opposition, to
environmental protection.76 In determining the funding scheme’s
constitutionality, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the
analysis conducted in Robinson Township, focusing on the applica-
ble trust law principles.77
In PEDF, the court looked to the text of section 27 and trust law
to outline the contours of the Commonwealth’s duties as trustee.78
In the absence of appropriate, Pennsylvanian public trust law, the
court turned to private doctrine, which “provide[d] ... the necessary
tools to properly interpret the trust created by [s]ection 27.”79 The
Commonwealth’s powers and duties were constrained by the
ENV’T L. REV. 333, 352 (1993))).
73. 161 A.3d 911, 930-33 (Pa. 2017).
74. Id. at 919-20.
75. Id. at 921-22.
76. See id. at 921.
77. Id. at 932-33.
78. Kenneth T. Kristl, The Devil Is in the Details: Articulating Practical Principles for
Implementing the Duties in Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights Amendment, 28 GEO.ENV’T
L. REV. 589, 596-97 (2016); see also PEDF, 161 A.3d at 933, 935.
79. PEDF, 161 A.3d at 934 n.26 (“[W]hile we appreciate that [s]ection 27 establishes a
public trust, we also recognize that the ‘public trust doctrine’ does not set forth universally
applicable black letter law and that Pennsylvania has no established public trust principles
applicable to [s]ection 27.”).
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meaning of “trust” and “trustee” at the time the amendment was
ratified.80 As such, the Commonwealth acted as a fiduciary and
owed its beneficiaries a duty to handle the environment “with pru-
dence, loyalty, and impartiality.”81 When acting with prudence,
trustees must “consider[ ] the purposes, provisions, distributional
requirements and other circumstances of the trust and by exercising
reasonable care, skill and caution.”82 Accordingly, the trustee cannot
make decisions regarding the trust in isolation; instead, it must look
to how a particular choice fits into the broader purpose of the
trust.83
In fulfilling its duty of loyalty while administering the trust, the
Commonwealth must act exclusively in the beneficiaries’ interests
and cannot “place [itself] in a position that is inconsistent with the
interests of the trust.”84 When a trustee administers the trust “in a
way that constitutes self-dealing or otherwise benefits the trustee
personally at the expense of beneficiaries,” the trustee violates its
duty of loyalty.85
In trusts with multiple beneficiaries, as in the section 27 trust,
the trustee owes a duty of impartiality to all of the beneficiaries.86
This is not to say that all beneficiaries must be treated equally but
“that the trustee must treat all equitably in light of the purposes of
the trust.”87 In fulfilling its duties, a trustee may exercise discretion,
but only within the bounds of the trust’s purpose and terms.88
The court then articulated how these obligations and the ERA’s
plain language informed the Commonwealth’s allocation of funds
from the lease agreements.89 Payments made in consideration for
natural resources constituted proceeds from the sale of the body of
80. Id. at 932.
81. Id. (quoting Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 956-57 (Pa. 2013)).
82. 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7774 (West 2020).
83. John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional Public Trust, 45 ENV’T
L. 463, 506 (2015).
84. Estate of McCredy, 470 A.2d 585, 597 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); see also PEDF, 161 A.3d
at 932.
85. Dernbach, supra note 83, at 508.
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 232 (AM. L. INST. 2012).
87. Dernbach, supra note 83, at 509.
88. PEDF, 161 A.3d at 933 (citing Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 978
(Pa. 2013)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 186 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2012).
89. PEDF, 161 A.3d at 936.
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the trust.90 As such, the court held the Commonwealth must
reinvest those funds in the trust for conservation and maintenance
purposes.91 The court rejected the argument that the General As-
sembly had sufficient discretion under section 27 to allocate pro-
ceeds to any project that benefited Pennsylvanians.92 Rather, section
27’s language “for the benefit of all the people” must be read in light
of the trust’s purpose.93 The trust was established to protect Penn-
sylvania’s natural resources.94 The Commonwealth must therefore
use trust assets for environmental conservation and maintenance
purposes only.95
The court did not decide whether all payments made for oil and
gas leases must remain in the corpus of the trust.96 However, it held
that all sale proceeds belong to the trust and that to claim otherwise
was to confuse the duties owed as a trustee with those of a propri-
etor.97 Notably, the court held that whatever form of revenue the
payments constituted, the Commonwealth nevertheless violates its
fiduciary duties if the leases “remove assets from the corpus of the
trust or otherwise deprive the trust beneficiaries ... of the funds
necessary to conserve and maintain the public natural resources.”98
By clearly laying out the Commonwealth’s duties as trustee of
Pennsylvania’s environmental trust, the court defined both the
procedural and substantive elements of the ERA.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 933-34.
92. Id. at 935.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 934.
96. Id. at 935-36. The court remanded the issue of whether the “rental payments” at issue
had to go toward the trust in full. Id.; see also Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 214
A.3d 748, 773 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2019) (holding that bonus and rental payments were not part
of the corpus of the trust and therefore could be allocated to the general fund).
97. PEDF, 161 A.3d at 932 (“Under [s]ection 27, the Commonwealth may not act as a mere
proprietor, pursuant to which it ‘deals at arms[’] length with its citizens, measuring its gains
by the balance sheet profits and appreciation it realizes from its resources operations.’”
(second alteration in original) (quoting PA. L. JOURNAL, 154th General Assembly, No. 118,
Reg. Sess., 2269, 2273 (1970))).
98. Id. at 936.
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B. The Environmental Rights Amendment and Climate Change
Climate scientists have articulated the many ways in which
climate change will negatively affect Pennsylvania specifically and
the planet generally.99 Section 27’s text, legislative history, and case
law all support an expansive interpretation of the Commonwealth’s
duties to protect Pennsylvanians’ rights and Pennsylvania’s envi-
ronment.100 This Section first explains how climate change poses a
direct threat to the environmental qualities protected in the ERA’s
first sentence, which the Commonwealth has a duty to protect. The
Section next shows how the Commonwealth’s affirmative and
prohibitory duties as trustee require it to take meaningful action to
combat climate change.
1. Climate Change as a Threat to the People’s Environmental
Rights
The effects of climate change have already damaged the Common-
wealth101 and continue to endanger the interests specifically enu-
merated and protected in section 27.102 Pennsylvanians have a
constitutional right to clean air and water.103 As pollutants, GHG
emissions threaten the right to clean air.104 GHG emissions also
contribute to feedback loops in which warming temperatures cause
systemic warmer temperatures.105 Rising temperatures lead to
99. See, e.g., Climate Change in PA, supra note 2; U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM,
CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT 12-15 (2017), https://science2017.globalchange.gov/
downloads/CSSR2017_FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EJ9-D7Z6].
100. See supra Part II.A. 
101. Climate Change in PA, supra note 2. In 2018 alone, severe weather patterns caused
over $125 million in damage in the commonwealth. Id.
102. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27; see also, e.g., JAMES SHORTLE, DAVID ABLER, SETH BLUMSACK,
ALIANA BRITSON, KUAI FANG, ARMEN KEMANIAN, PAUL KNIGHT SR., MARC MCDILL, RAYMOND
NAJJAR, MICHAEL NASSRY, RICHARD READY, ANDREW ROSS, MATTHEW RYDZIK, CHAOPENG
SHEN, SHILONG WANG, DENICE WARDROP & SUSAN YETTER, PA. STATE UNIV., PENNSYLVANIA
CLIMATE IMPACTS ASSESSMENT UPDATE 6-14(2015), https://www.pennfuture.org/Files/Admin/
Pennsylvania-Climate-Impacts-Assessment-Update---2700-BK-DEP4494.compressed.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W26A-H63F].
103. See PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27.
104. Climate Change in PA, supra note 2.
105. The Study of Earth as an Integrated System, NASA GLOB. CLIMATE CHANGE, https://
climate.nasa.gov/nasa_science/science/ [https://perma.cc/8L32-M8N8].
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extreme weather patterns such as flooding, which degrades water
quality.106
Although “clean” air and “pure” water are “relative rather than
absolute attributes,” the ERA’s language establishes standards with
which courts can measure violations.107 To assist courts in making
such a determination, environmental agencies would first make a
factual assessment as to whether air or water quality met those
standards.108 Courts would then determine whether the “actual or
likely degradation” of those elements constituted a violation of
section 27.109 Climate change, caused by GHG emissions, has clearly
degraded, and will continue to degrade, air and water quality.110
Thus, because the Commonwealth has an affirmative duty to pre-
vent such harm to the environment, failure to curb GHG emissions
would violate Pennsylvanians’ enumerated environmental rights.
2. The Duty to Fight Climate Change
The Pennsylvania courts’ interpretation of section 27 in both
Robinson Township and PEDF makes clear that the Commonwealth
must act affirmatively via legislation to protect natural resources,
and it must prohibit unreasonable degradation by both state and
private parties.111 Because climate change will unreasonably and
permanently degrade the quality of the air, water, and other natural
resources, the Commonwealth must combat climate change in order
to conserve and maintain the environment and to uphold its duties
under section 27.112
106. Climate Change in PA, supra note 2 (noting that, across the state, precipitation
increased between 10 and 20 percent in recent years, leading to more flooding incidents).
107. Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 953 (Pa. 2013). 
108. Id. (citing 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 6026.102(4) (West 2020)). State and federal
regulations establish technical air and water standards, and as with any other technical
standard, “courts generally defer to agency expertise in making a factual determination
whether the benchmarks were met.” Id.
109. Id. (citing Mont. Env’t Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1249 (Mont.
1999)).
110. Climate Change in PA, supra note 2.
111. PEDF v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 931-33 (Pa. 2017); Robinson Township, 83
A.3d at 952.
112. Cf. Rogelj et al., supra note 1.
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Reducing GHG emissions is critical to combatting climate
change.113 Pennsylvania’s carbon emissions amount to roughly 0.5
percent of the world’s total emissions, which is more than most
countries.114 In light of the threats posed by climate change and the
Commonwealth’s constitutional duties, Pennsylvania must act by
implementing limits on carbon and other GHG emissions.115 It is
important to note that the Commonwealth has implemented some
measures to that end; both the Pennsylvania Climate Change Act
(CCA) and the Air Pollution Quality Act (APQA) have led to the
creation of climate change plans and the regulation of air pollution,
including GHGs, in compliance with the federal Clean Air Act.116
However, given the imminence and severity of the threats climate
change poses, the Commonwealth must take more aggressive action
than these current regulations provide.
This Note does not claim that the only way the Commonwealth
can fulfill its section 27 duties is to join the Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative (RGGI); the cap and trade program is simply the
means of reducing GHGs that the governor and DEP have pro-
posed.117 From a logistical perspective, RGGI is a convenient
choice—it is a pre-existing, successful program in which almost all
of Pennsylvania’s neighbors participate.118 However, the Common-
wealth could similarly fulfill its constitutional duties by reducing
113. Id.
114. Justine McDaniel, Here’s What Pennsylvania Is Doing to Address Climate
Change—and Why Politics Is Making It Difficult, PHILA. INQUIRER (Sept. 18, 2019),
https://www.inquirer.com/news/pennsylvania-climate-change-governor-wolf-carbon-state-
action-20190918.html [https://perma.cc/CWK6-LYH8].
115. See McKinstry & Dernbach, supra note 7, at 78.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 7423; 71 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1361.3, 1361.7 (2008); 35 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 4004.1 (1996). The federal Clean Air Act establishes the floor for pollution standards, not
the ceiling, and therefore allows states to enact more stringent regulations if they so choose.
42 U.S.C. § 7416. Beyond that point, the interaction between federal and state environmental
regulations is beyond the scope of this Note. For a more detailed discussion of the relationship
between state and federal regulations, see generally Clay Kulesza, Note, The Devil in NEPA’s
Details: Amending NEPA to Prevent State Interference with Environmental Reviews, 62 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1041 (2021).
117. See Pa. Exec. Order No. 2019-07, supra note 25.
118. See Elements of RGGI, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org/
program-overview-and-design/elements [https://perma.cc/ZV7F-YNHA].
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GHG emissions in other ways, including creating its own cap and
trade program or by taxing carbon emissions.119
III. CAPPING CARBON: THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE
Human-produced GHGs are the leading cause of climate
change.120 The 2018 IPCC Report shows that to avoid the worst
impacts of climate change, “anthropogenic” GHG emissions must
“decline by about 45% from 2010 levels by 2030 ... reaching net zero
around 2050.”121 No single measure can instantly achieve carbon
neutrality, but humans must take aggressive steps to drastically
reduce GHG production by midcentury.122 Carbon trading offers one
of the most effective tools123 for governments to reach those
targets.124 This Part first explains how such programs work gen-
erally and then goes on to explore how the Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative (RGGI) operates in particular. Finally, this Part looks
to Governor Wolf ’s executive order to implement a carbon trading
program in Pennsylvania.
119. See Rogelj et al., supra note 1, at 152-53 (describing various methods of reducing GHG
emissions). These alternative methods of fulfilling section 27 duties are particularly important
as efforts to block the implementation of Governor Wolf’s Order continue. See, e.g., Rachel
McDevitt, Wolf Vetoes Bill That Would Keep Pennsylvania Out of RGGI, STATEIMPACT PA.
(Sept. 24, 2020, 4:53 PM), https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2020/09/24/wolf-vetoes-
bill-that-would-keep-pennsylvania-out-of-rggi/ [https://perma.cc/A4FW-LJJE] (describing a
recent example of legislative attempts to prevent Pennsylvania from joining RGGI).
120. See Solomon et al., supra note 3, at 1704.
121. See Rogelj et al., supra note 1, at 95. This more ambitious schedule limits global
warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Id. The report also describes more gradual
schemes. Id. at 97.
122. See id.
123. See, e.g., Justin Gerdes, Cap and Trade Curbed Acid Rain: 7 Reasons Why It Can Do
the Same for Climate Change, FORBES (Feb. 13, 2012, 12:53 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
justingerdes/2012/02/13/cap-and-trade-curbed-acid-rain-7-reasons-why-it-can-do-the-same-for-
climate-change/#3de5fed943aa [https://perma.cc/L9CM-6L2K] (discussing the success of
President George H.W. Bush’s cap and trade program in drastically reducing acid rain). 
124. See Rogelj et al., supra note 1, at 95-96, 148-49, 152-53. The report proposes carbon
pricing generally, which includes both carbon taxes and cap and trade systems. Id. at 152-53.
Because Governor Wolf’s executive order did not include carbon taxes, the use of these taxes
and their relation to section 27 are beyond the scope of this Note.
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A. The Importance of Carbon Trading
In a cap and trade program, participating governments establish
a ceiling on the amount of carbon an industry (or an entire economy)
can emit per year.125 At set intervals, the program lowers that
ceiling until industries reach the desired emissions levels.126 The
total amount of permitted emissions is divided into equal parts,
usually one short ton of carbon, called “allowances.”127 Participants
purchase emissions allowances, typically at auctions, based on their
anticipated needs.128 Auction organizers set the clearing price of
allowances based on the market value.129 Essentially, polluters must
pay for the ability to emit carbon and other GHGs into the atmo-
sphere.130 A secondary market enables participants to purchase
additional allowances from companies that emitted less carbon than
anticipated and did not use their full allowances.131 In this market-
based system, polluters pay a premium for not investing in clean
energy, thereby encouraging polluters to expeditiously develop more
sustainable practices and “creat[e] market certainty to drive long-
term investments in clean energy.”132
As of 2019, fifty-seven jurisdictions around the world participat-
ed in carbon pricing initiatives.133 Of those, twenty-nine used a cap
and trade system.134 In the United States, outside of RGGI, only
California had implemented a cap and trade program.135 While none
of these programs have achieved carbon neutrality yet, many




129. See Cap and Trade Basics, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS., https://www.c2es.org/
content/cap-and-trade-basics/ [https://perma.cc/QDF5-M6CE].
130. See Szybist, supra note 28.
131. See id.
132. See REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, THE INVESTMENT OF RGGI PROCEEDS IN
2017, at 1, 4 (2019), https://www.rggi.org/sites/default/files/Uploads/Proceeds/RGGI_Proceeds_
Report_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/RG99-F8TZ]; see also Cap and Trade Basics, supra note
129.
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jurisdictions have made significant reductions in their carbon
emissions.136
B. The Reality of RGGI in Other States
In 2009, nine states in New England and the mid-Atlantic joined
together to implement the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI).137 The region committed to reducing carbon emissions
through a market-based system of allowances, auctions, trading,
and investing.138 The states set a collective carbon cap and created
the Model Rule to standardize the program’s implementation and
regulation in each state.139 Every quarter, participants bid on
allowances at an auction hosted by RGGI.140 Independent entities
monitor and provide reports on these auctions to evaluate the
market and ensure that all parties adhere to the program’s rules.141
In 2014, based on a 2012 review of the program, RGGI partici-
pants set their cap at ninety-one million short tons, which declined
by 2.5 percent each year between 2015 and 2020142 and will decline
by 3 percent per year between 2021 and 2030.143 States sell their
excess allowances through RGGI-operated auctions and invest the
proceeds in a variety of energy-related projects.144 The negotiated
136. See Brad Plumer & Nadja Popovich, These Countries Have Prices on Carbon. Are They
Working?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/02/
climate/pricing-carbon-emissions.html [https://perma.cc/M53Z-TRBN] (explaining, for exam-
ple, the high prices and wide application of Canada’s program and that Britain’s emissions
are at their lowest point since 1890).
137. Ho, supra note 26.
138. See Welcome,REG’LGREENHOUSE GASINITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org [https://perma.
cc/LJL2-WT2C].
139. See REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, MODEL RULE PART XX CO2 BUDGET TRADING
PROGRAM 22-26 (2018), https://www.rggi.org/sites/default/files/Uploads/Design-Archive/Model-
Rule/2017-Program-Review-Update/2017_Model_Rule_revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3GR-
NEQ6]; see also Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY
SOLS., https://www.c2es.org/content/regional-greenhouse-gas-initiative-rggi/ [https://perma.cc/
MPD8-DE99].
140. See Elements of RGGI, supra note 118.
141. See, e.g., Auction 45, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org/
Auction/45 [https://perma.cc/ABA5-58PJ].
142. Welcome, supra note 138.
143. Ho, supra note 26.
144. Investments of Proceeds, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, https://www.rggi.org/
investments/proceeds-investments [https://perma.cc/A6AZ-HNWT]. These projects vary by
state but generally include programs dealing with energy efficiency, renewable energy
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budget for the current members in 2019 was 80.2 million tons.145
When a new state joins RGGI, it must renegotiate the cap with
other members to accommodate its emissions while adhering to the
“stringency” of the prior cap.146
The program specifically targets emissions from fossil-fuel power
plants throughout the region.147 Since the inception of the program,
member states have reduced their carbon emissions by over half.148
The states have also created $4.3 billion in economic value in the
region, saved their constituents millions of dollars, and created
thousands of jobs.149 Using the RGGI Model Rule, each member
state develops its own internal regulations for participation, cover-
ing issues such as how to manage proceeds from auctions.150 In
2017, RGGI states invested 51 percent of auction proceeds in ener-
gy efficiency programs, 16 percent in direct bill assistance, 14 per-
cent in clean energy, 14 percent in GHG abatement, and less than
6 percent in administrative costs.151 These investments help to fur-
ther reduce GHG emissions and consumer costs.152 The variety of
RGGI’s achievements demonstrates the power of cap and trade
systems.
Under the RGGI program, states do not achieve lower carbon
emissions by simply shutting down high-emissions power plants.153
By investing in renewable energy source development and other
green initiatives, states have strengthened their economies, lowered
energy costs, and created jobs, all while meaningfully tackling
climate change.154
sources, and direct bill assistance. Id.
145. Szybist, supra note 28.
146. Id.
147. See Ho, supra note 26.
148. Id.
149. Id.; see also REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, supra note 132, at 3, 6, 9.
150. See REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, supra note 132, at 6-7.
151. Id. at 5.
152. See id. at 3-11, 14.
153. Cf. Ho, supra note 26 (explaining limits on emissions and process of purchasing
allowances).
154. See REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, supra note 132, at 4-14. In 2017 alone, RGGI
investments helped avoid 438,099 short tons of carbon dioxide emissions, prevented the burn-
ing of 1,424,199 MMBtu of fossil fuels, and saved consumers $128,704,015 on energy bills. Id.
at 6.
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C. Governor Wolf’s Executive Order
On October 3, 2019, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf signed
Executive Order 2019-07, titled “Commonwealth Leadership in
Addressing Climate Change Through Electric Sector Emissions
Reductions.”155 Based on a 2019 Pennsylvania Climate Action Plan,
Wolf ordered the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) to
“develop and present” a “proposed rulemaking package to abate,
control, or limit carbon dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel-fired
electric power generators” to the state Environmental Quality
Board.156 The DEP’s proposals must (1) involve an outreach com-
ponent targeting various stakeholders, (2) create a GHG budget,
and (3) establish annual carbon dioxide emission auctions.157 Wolf ’s
order requires that all elements of the DEP’s plan comport with
RGGI’s standards to allow Pennsylvania to participate in the cap
and trade program in the near future.158
Under section 27, Governor Wolf has not only the power but also
the duty to take this kind of executive action.159 Further, both
Pennsylvania’s Air Pollution Control Act160 and Climate Change
Act161 provide the DEP with authority to limit carbon emissions. The
question remains, however, as to where proceeds from RGGI
auctions could go.162
IV. WHERE CAN THE MONEY GO?: APPLYING TRUST PRINCIPLES TO
A CAP AND TRADE PROGRAM
Modeling shows that, depending on the exact price, auctioning
Pennsylvania’s carbon allowances in RGGI could produce over
two hundred million dollars per year between 2021 and 2030.163
155. Pa. Exec. Order No. 2019-07, supra note 25.
156. Id. (citing the Air Pollution Control Act of January 8, 1960, 35 PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 4001-4015, as the source of authorization for such action).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See supra Part II.B.2; see also McKinstry & Dernbach, supra note 7, at 89-90
(discussing additional duties of the Commonwealth to regulate emissions).
160. Air Pollution Control Act, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 4001-4015 (1960).
161. Pennsylvania Climate Change Act, 71 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1361.1-1361.8 (2008).
162. See Szybist, supra note 28.
163. Id.
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Environmental activists disagree about the extent to which the ERA
dictates how the Commonwealth could use auction funds.164 One
side of the debate argues that, because emission auctions would
operate as a regulatory measure necessary to preserve the environ-
mental trust, auction proceeds would constitute income and would
therefore not have to return to the corpus of the trust.165 Alterna-
tively, if RGGI is understood as a program that sells natural
resources, auction revenue would constitute proceeds from the
liquidation of trust principal, and basic trust principles would
require the state to reinvest all auction proceeds in the corpus of the
trust.166 Both sides urge that their paradigm best achieves the
ERA’s purpose. This Section first analyzes the implications of both
frameworks under the ERA and then lays out the various enforce-
ment options available to Pennsylvania courts.
A. Directing the Funds
If RGGI is a regulatory measure to preserve Pennsylvania’s
environmental trust, without additional legislation, auction pro-
ceeds must go toward the Commonwealth’s General Fund.167 While
some budgetary concerns weigh in favor of this approach,168 to
characterize the auction revenue strictly as income ignores the ERA,
mischaracterizes the transaction, and departs from standard trust
doctrine. Instead, for reasons described in more detail below,
allowance auctions are more properly viewed as sales of natural
resources. However, this Note argues that, regardless of how one
views these auctions, the ERA and basic trust principles require
that auction proceeds be used to maintain and preserve Pennsyl-
vania’s environment.
164. See, e.g., McKinstry & Dernbach, supra note 7, at 107-08; Szybist, supra note 28.
165. See McKinstry & Dernbach, supra note 7, at 108 (“Instead of being considered the
proceeds from the liquidation of the principal of the trust, auction revenues are more properly
considered to constitute income from measures to manage the trust corpus, much like income
from sustainable harvest of timber. Therefore, the proceeds from these revenues can be used
for any purpose, provided the use accrues to the benefit of the trust’s beneficiaries.”); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (AM. L. INST. 2007).
166. See McKinstry & Dernbach, supra note 7, at 109-10.
167. See id. at 108; see also 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8 (2020) (providing that, unless stated
otherwise in additional legislation, all payments go toward Pennsylvania’s General Fund).
168. See McKinstry & Dernbach, supra note 7, at 108-09.
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1. Allowance Auctions as Sales of Natural Resources
While the PEDF decision did not involve RGGI, it would directly
control the use of cap and trade proceeds from an RGGI auction.169
In PEDF, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that to comport
with the terms of the section 27 trust, the Commonwealth may not
allow private entities to deplete natural resources without just com-
pensation.170 Further, any payments viewed as consideration for
those resources constitute proceeds from the sale of trust principal
and therefore must be reinvested to conserve and maintain the
trust.171
Payments for carbon allowances are properly understood as
consideration for the sale of trust principal.172 When power generat-
ing plants pay for carbon allowances, they pay for access to, and use
of, air that they can pollute with carbon and other GHGs.173 Clean
air is specifically listed in section 27’s first sentence, and, as a basic
necessity for all living things, it is also an invaluable natural
resource.174 Earth’s atmosphere can accommodate only so many
GHGs before the climate is permanently changed, making air a
limited natural resource.175 The more that humans pollute the air
with GHGs, the more they deplete a resource within the ERA’s
trust.176 Thus, the payments made for carbon allowances are best
169. Cf. PEDF v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 935 (Pa. 2017) (“Pennsylvania trust law
dictates that proceeds from the sale of trust assets are trust principal and remain part of the
corpus of the trust.” (citing In re McKeown’s Estate, 106 A. 189, 190 (Pa. 1919))).
170. Id. at 936.
171. Id.
172. See McKinstry & Dernbach, supra note 7, at 109 (“[O]ne can view the auction of
allowances as a charge for the sale of a public natural resource, either: (1) the air, (2) the
limited capacity of the atmosphere to absorb GHG emissions without disrupting the climate,
or (3) the costs that will be imposed on future generations from carbon dioxide emissions (i.e.
‘ecosystem services’—one of the natural values of the environment).”).
173. See id.
174. See PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27.
175. See McKinstry & Dernbach, supra note 7, at 69 (noting that, as a practical matter, air
has “relative rather than absolute attributes” (quoting Robinson Township v. Commonwealth,
83 A.3d 901, 953 (Pa. 2013))).
176. See Marie Loiseau, Comment, Revived Authority in Article I, Section 27 of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution: The Commonwealth’s New Affirmative Duty to Protect the Atmosphere,
91 TEMP. L. REV. 183, 207-08 (2018).
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understood as payments for trust principal.177 All proceeds from the
auction must therefore be invested in the maintenance and conser-
vation of the trust.178
2. Allowance Auctions as Trust Regulation
Even if auctions are understood as trust regulation, making the
auction revenue income, the Commonwealth’s duties as trustee
require that it reinvest all revenue in Pennsylvania’s environmental
trust.179 While using the proceeds from allowance auctions for
general purposes would not necessarily harm the beneficiaries
directly or immediately, such use would not comport with the
purpose of section 27’s trust.180 The failure to invest funds earned
through auctions in the trust would therefore constitute a breach of
the Commonwealth’s fiduciary duties.181
Allowing auction proceeds to remain in the General Fund would
alleviate budgetary concerns, serving the Commonwealth’s self-
interests, and would likely help many beneficiaries by funding state-
operated programs.182 However, depriving beneficiaries of the funds
necessary to preserve the interests specifically protected by the ERA
violates the Commonwealth’s fiduciary duty of loyalty.183
Further, climate change threatens to impose enormous financial
burdens on the Commonwealth.184 Directing money away from
environmental protection in light of such an imminent threat devi-
ates from the Commonwealth’s duty to act prudently.185 That duty
177. Cf. PEDF v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 935-36 (Pa. 2017) (holding payments for
oil and gas amounted to proceeds from the sale of trust principal).
178. Id.
179. See supra Part II.A.2.
180. See Robinson Township, 83 A.3d at 957-59.
181. Cf. PEDF, 161 A.3d at 933, 938 (discussing the Commonwealth’s duties to enact
legislation to protect the trust and maintain the corpus of the trust).
182. See McKinstry & Dernbach, supra note 7, at 108-09.
183. Cf. PEDF, 161 A.3d at 932-33 (discussing the Commonwealth’s duty of loyalty under
section 27); Estate of McCredy, 470 A.2d 585, 597 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (“The rule prohibits
both self-dealing and conflicts of interest. Thus, the trustee must neither 1) deal with trust
property for the benefit of himself or third parties ... nor 2) place himself in a position
inconsistent with the interests of the trust.” (citing 39 P.L.E. Trusts §§ 185-186)).
184. See Climate Change in PA, supra note 2.
185. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (AM.L.INST. 1959) (“The trustee is under
a duty to ... exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in
dealing with his own property.”).
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directs the Commonwealth to maintain auction proceeds within the
corpus of the trust to fully fund projects necessary to conserve and
protect the environment, which would include measures to combat
climate change.186
Absent additional legislation, Pennsylvania law requires that all
payments made to the Commonwealth go to its General Fund.187
The General Assembly would therefore have to enact legislation to
ensure that auction payments were reinvested in the environmental
trust.188 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has specifically held that
the Commonwealth has a duty to pass legislation necessary to
protect the environment.189 Separation of powers principles dictate
that a court could not tell the General Assembly exactly what
legislation to enact or what kind of conservation projects to fund.190
Courts would, however, have the power to generally ensure that the
Commonwealth invested the auction funds in the environmental
trust, in compliance with its constitutional duties.191
Protecting the environment from climate change will take
significant, coordinated efforts and considerable financial invest-
ments from the Commonwealth.192 Thus, whether the Common-
wealth views RGGI auctions as a sale of trust principal that
generates proceeds or merely as a regulation of the trust that
produces income, as trustee, Pennsylvania must keep the money
within the environmental trust.
186. Cf. id. cmt. c (explaining that trustees do not use proper care unless they act with an
understanding of the terms of the trust and the nature of the trust property).
187. 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8 (2020).
188. Cf. Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 958 (Pa. 2013) (describing
examples of legislation passed by the General Assembly to meet its duty to protect the
environment).
189. PEDF v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 933 (Pa. 2017); Robinson Township, 83 A.3d
at 958.
190. Cf. PEDF, 161 A.3d at 933 (“[T]he Commonwealth must act affirmatively via
legislative action to protect the environment.” (citing Robinson Township, 83 A.3d at 958)).
191. See infra Part IV.B.
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B. Enforcing Section 27 Duties
As of early 2021, Governor Wolf supports taking action against
climate change, and opponents do not have the veto-proof majority
in the General Assembly necessary to block his environmental
policies.193 However, that political makeup will inevitably change
with time, which could encumber further attempts to enact environ-
mental regulations.194 This Section explores the mechanisms with
which courts could enforce the Commonwealth’s affirmative duties
under the ERA, particularly against a less environmentally friendly
administration. First, recent decisions show the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s willingness to review the Commonwealth’s perfor-
mance in protecting constitutional rights.195 Second, any legislation
or policies obstructing the enactment of Governor Wolf ’s executive
order or the fulfillment of the Commonwealth’s ERA duties would
be unconstitutional.196
1. Performance Review for the Commonwealth
While claims regarding government inaction typically raise
separation of powers concerns, particularly at the federal level, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in William Penn School
District v. Pennsylvania Department of Education made clear that
such concerns do not preclude commonwealth courts from reviewing
the Commonwealth’s failure to act.197 In William Penn, a group of
students and other interested parties claimed that the General
Assembly failed to fulfill its constitutional mandate to maintain “a
thorough and efficient” public school system.198 The Commonwealth
193. See, e.g., Logan Hullinger, Once Interested, House Republicans Blast Wolf over RGGI,
YORK DISPATCH (Oct. 9, 2019, 3:40 PM), https://www.yorkdispatch.com/story/news/
local/2019/10/08/once-interested-house-republicans-blast-wolf-over-rggi/3898783002/
[https://perma.cc/2TM8-32UW]; McDevitt, supra note 119; Pennsylvania State Senate
Elections, 2020, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Pennsylvania_State_Senate_elections,_
2020 [https://perma.cc/G28G-NJBY]; Pennsylvania House of Representatives Election, 2020,
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Pennsylvania_House_of_Representatives_elections,_
2020 [https://perma.cc/MV7J-8PML].
194. See, e.g., McDaniel, supra note 114.
195. See William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 170 A.3d 414, 463-64 (Pa. 2017).
196. Cf. PEDF v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 938-39 (Pa. 2017).
197. 170 A.3d at 463-64. 
198. Id. at 417 (quoting PA. CONST. art. III, § 14).
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argued that reviewing the General Assembly’s decisions would
violate separation of powers principles and pose a nonjusticiable
political question.199
While recognizing that such justiciability concerns could, in
certain circumstances, preclude courts from reviewing a case, the
court maintained that the judiciary should “be skeptical of calls to
abstain from a given constitutional dispute.”200 Instead, Pennsylva-
nia courts should refrain from hearing and resolving claims only
when the power has been “exclusively and finally” granted to other
branches of government.201 Absent that specific delegation, courts
have the capacity to interpret constitutional duties and determine
the minimum requirements established therein without infringing
on the General Assembly’s policy making powers.202 Thus, while the
court could not instruct the General Assembly to implement specific
policies, it could measure the Commonwealth’s fulfillment of its
constitutional duties and find that the government fell short of its
mandate.203
Similarly, in the context of the ERA, a court could assess the
Commonwealth’s compliance with its constitutional duties, par-
ticularly in light of the threats posed by climate change.204 The
ERA confers its powers and duties on every level of government
in the Commonwealth.205 Separation of powers would preclude a
court from mandating the implementation of particular policies. It
199. Id. at 432-33.
200. Id. at 418; see also Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 917 (Pa. 2013)
(“In contrast to the federal approach, notions of case or controversy and justiciability in Penn-
sylvania have no constitutional predicate, do not involve a court’s jurisdiction, and are re-
garded instead as prudential concerns implicating courts’ self-imposed limitations.” (citations
omitted)).
201. William Penn Sch. Dist., 170 A.3d at 438 (first citing Sweeney v. Tucker, 375 A.2d 698,
706 (Pa. 1977); and then citing Council 13, AFSCME ex rel. Fillman v. Rendell, 986 A.2d 63,
76 (Pa. 2009)).
202. Id. at 463-64 (“It is a mistake to conflate legislative policy-making pursuant to a
constitutional mandate with constitutional interpretation of that mandate and the minimum
that it requires.... [C]ourts have the capacity to differentiate a constitutional threshold, which
ultimately is ours to determine, from the particular policy needs of a given moment, which lie
within the General Assembly’s purview.”).
203. Id. The case was remanded to the Commonwealth Court, where proceedings on the
merits have continued. William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., No. 587 M.D. 2014, 2018
WL 2090329, at *1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 7, 2018).
204. Cf. William Penn Sch. Dist., 170 A.3d at 463.
205. See Robinson Township, 83 A.3d at 952.
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would not, however, bar the judiciary from reviewing existing en-
vironmental regulations to ensure that, as a whole, they met the
ERA’s standards.206 If, as the plaintiffs asserted in William Penn re-
garding education, the amalgamation of policies failed to sufficiently
protect the environment, a court could hold that the Commonwealth
violated the constitution by failing to uphold its duties.207
2. Unconstitutional Legislation
Governor Wolf ’s executive order mandates the creation and
administration of a carbon-reducing cap and trade program.208 This
is a critical step in the fulfillment of the Commonwealth’s consti-
tutional duties.209 The implementation process will likely outlast
Wolf ’s tenure, which could expose RGGI or a comparable measure
to an administration less devoted to environmental protection.210
However, Robinson Township instructs that legislation inconsistent
with the Commonwealth’s ERA duties, particularly when enacted
to limit measures meant to protect the environment, is unconsti-
tutional.211
In Robinson Township, localities challenged the General Assem-
bly’s legislative attempt to preempt fracking regulation at the state
level, thereby protecting the fracking industry and preventing local
governments from implementing their own restrictions.212 The
General Assembly had attempted to provide accommodations for “an
industry, offering the very real prospect of jobs and other important
economic benefits, [that sought] to exploit a Pennsylvania resource,”
despite the fact that such exploitation, “[b]y any responsible ac-
count,” would seriously harm the environment.213 This was exactly
the sort of scenario the ERA contemplated and that its drafters
intended to prevent.214 The court emphasized that the action cen-
tered on the Commonwealth’s “compliance with constitutional
206. See William Penn Sch. Dist., 170 A.3d at 463-64.
207. See id.
208. Pa. Exec. Order No. 2019-07, supra note 25.
209. See supra Part II.B.
210. See Pa. Exec. Order No. 2019-07, supra note 25 (laying out a multiyear process).
211. Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 976, 985 (Pa. 2013).
212. Id. at 914-16; see also Tuholske, supra note 18, at 248.
213. Robinson Township, 83 A.3d at 976.
214. See id.
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duties,”215 not “a dispute over public policy voiced by a disappointed
minority.”216 The legislation at issue served the interest of the
fracking industry, not the beneficiaries of the Commonwealth’s envi-
ronmental trust.217 As such, the exercise of police power in enacting
that legislation violated Pennsylvanians’ environmental rights and
the Commonwealth’s duties as trustee of the environmental trust.218
In PEDF, the court held that siphoning off payments made in
consideration for the depletion of Pennsylvania’s natural resources
for nonenvironmental purposes was “a clear violation of the most
basic of a trustee’s fiduciary obligations.”219 Similarly, if a future
administration attempted to exercise its police power by rolling back
GHG emission caps without a comparable replacement, such
legislation would violate the ERA and could be struck down.220
Whether the Commonwealth moves forward with joining RGGI or
chooses to use another GHG reduction method, the use of any funds
generated through those programs for nonenvironmental purposes
would violate the ERA.221
V. COUNTERARGUMENTS
Despite clear support from developing ERA jurisprudence, oppo-
nents will likely raise concerns regarding the propriety of courts
mandating Commonwealth action and the sufficiency of RGGI as a
means to fulfill the Commonwealth’s duties. This Part addresses
these counterarguments.
A. Concerns About Mandating Executive and Legislative
Compliance
Those particularly concerned with separation of powers would
question courts’ ability to mandate the investment of auction
proceeds in the environmental trust. Proponents of such a view
215. Id. at 974.
216. Id. at 976.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 985.
219. PEDF v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 938 (Pa. 2017).
220. See Robinson Township, 83 A.3d at 985.
221. See PEDF, 161 A.3d at 938-39.
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would likely point to Funk v. Wolf, in which a group of young
Pennsylvanians sought a writ of mandamus to force the governor
and General Assembly to conduct specific studies and implement a
particular GHG reduction scheme.222 The plaintiffs also requested
a declaratory judgment stating that the ERA protects a right to an
atmosphere with safe levels of GHG and imposes a duty on the
Commonwealth to protect that right, and that the Commonwealth
had not fulfilled that duty.223 Though the court recognized that the
ERA imposed certain duties on the Commonwealth, it declined to
issue either form of relief.224 Instead, the court held that the ERA
did not “provide[ ] ... a clear right to the performance of the specific
acts,” nor did it mandate the performance of those acts.225 Critics
would likely assert that the decision in Funk would preclude a court
from issuing any sort of order mandating Commonwealth action.
While Funk accurately describes the limited appropriateness of
writs of mandamus, it by no means determines whether a court
could enforce the Commonwealth’s duties.226 Firstly, because the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Funk before PEDF overturned
Payne’s overly deferential test, the court relied on now consti-
tutionally unsound analysis in reviewing the plaintiffs’ claims
regarding the Commonwealth’s conduct.227 In a post-PEDF Penn-
sylvania, a court would view the government’s duties more broadly
and with less deference.228 Further, the court did not rule out the
possibility of granting a writ of mandamus in particular adminis-
trative situations.229
Likewise, the Funk court’s refusal to grant a declaratory judg-
ment is distinguishable from a scenario in which auction proceeds
are not properly invested in the environmental trust. Under Penn-
sylvania’s Declaratory Judgments Act, beneficiaries can seek a
222. 144 A.3d 228, 232-33 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016).
223. Id. at 251.
224. Id. at 248, 251.
225. Id. at 248, 250-51 (emphasis omitted).
226. See id. at 248-51.
227. Compare id. at 235 (explaining that compliance with the ERA essentially requires only
compliance with the General Assembly’s legislation), with PEDF v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d
911, 933 (Pa. 2017) (discussing the Commonwealth’s duties).
228. See PEDF, 161 A.3d at 932-33.
229. Funk, 144 A.3d at 243 (discussing the scenarios in which the court could review the
Environmental Quality Board’s and Environmental Hearing Board’s decisions to implement
proposed and detailed plans).
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judgment “[t]o direct ... trustees to do or abstain from doing any
particular act in their fiduciary capacity” or “[t]o determine any
question arising in the administration of the estate or trust.”230
Notwithstanding separation of powers concerns, the Act was in-
tended “to be liberally construed and administered.”231 However,
while making such declarations, Pennsylvania courts still may not
issue judgments that would be merely advisory and “not resolve the
controversy ... which spurred the request.”232
A declaratory judgment asserting that the ERA protects the right
to an atmosphere with safe levels of GHGs and that the Common-
wealth violated its duty to protect that right would do nothing to
compel the Commonwealth to fulfill its fiduciary duties, rendering
such a decision merely advisory.233 The same could not be said for a
situation in which the General Assembly failed to properly invest
auction proceeds. If citizens were to bring an action against the
Commonwealth for such a failure, a declaratory judgment ordering
the investment of auction proceeds in the environmental trust
would resolve the dispute.234 Further, Pennsylvania case law makes
clear that courts are far less concerned with separation of powers
issues than many courts at the federal level.235 Accordingly, while
a court could not tell the Commonwealth exactly how to use the
funds once in the environmental trust, it could nevertheless ensure
that auction proceeds were invested in the trust in the first place.236
Even in a scenario in which a declaratory judgment would be im-
proper, a court could still strike down any legislation that violated
the ERA.237 Attempts to prevent the implementation of a cap and
trade program without a sufficient replacement would plainly vi-
olate the Commonwealth’s duties as trustee and Pennsylvanians’
230. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7535(2)-(3) (2020). Pennsylvania courts have consistently relied
on private trust doctrine to interpret the ERA. See PEDF, 161 A.3d at 934 n.26.
231. Funk, 144 A.3d at 251 (quoting Off. of Governor v. Donahue, 98 A.3d 1223, 1229 (Pa.
2014)).
232. Id. (quoting Rendell v. Pa. State Ethics Comm’n, 938 A.2d 554, 559 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2007)).
233. See id.
234. Cf. id. at 251-52.
235. William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 170 A.3d 414, 435-39 (Pa. 2017).
236. See supra Part IV.A.2.
237. See supra Part IV.B.
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environmental rights, and would therefore be patently unconsti-
tutional.238
B. How Can RGGI Fulfill the Commonwealth’s Duties?
It is important to acknowledge at the outset that there is no
perfect response to a threat such as climate change, and RGGI is no
exception.239 However, joining RGGI and continuing to invest in
conserving Pennsylvania’s environment is currently the most viable
option to meet the Commonwealth’s constitutionally imposed
duty.240 Even still, opponents might argue that participation in
RGGI or a similar program would not fulfill the Commonwealth’s
constitutionally mandated duties. Such challenges would point to
the low cost of allowances as evidence that RGGI is too lenient a
program to effectively combat climate change and that participation
would therefore not fulfill the Commonwealth’s duties.241 While
increased stringency would certainly expedite reductions in carbon
emissions, the fact that RGGI is not as strict as possible does not
negate its success or the Commonwealth’s duty to implement a
carbon reduction plan.242
With a current clearing price of just over five dollars, RGGI’s
prices are undeniably lower than those of other countries, as most
countries charge between fifteen and thirty dollars per ton of carbon
emissions.243 Some environmentalists have suggested that programs
should determine the cost of allowances based on carbon’s social
cost.244 Though the exact methods of calculation vary, “[t]he social
cost of carbon is a measure of the future estimated cost or damage
resulting from the emission of a metric ton of carbon today.”245 Such
a price would certainly be more than five dollars and once imple-
mented, would spur accelerated carbon emissions reduction.
However, from a practical perspective, such a program would likely
238. See supra Part IV.B.
239. See, e.g., Rogelj et al., supra note 1, at 95.
240. See supra Part III.
241. See McKinstry & Dernbach, supra note 7, at 84-86 (asserting the necessity of high
prices for carbon allowances).
242. See supra Parts II.B.2, III.B.
243. See Plumer & Popovich, supra note 136.
244. McKinstry & Dernbach, supra note 7, at 89.
245. Id. at 85.
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face even harsher opposition and would be more difficult to en-
force.246 Thus, even if such a program was put in place, it would
likely not be as successful as RGGI or a comparable program.
Critics might also challenge the utility of a single state’s imple-
mentation of a cap and trade program (which obviously cannot fix
climate change on its own) while other states and countries continue
to emit GHGs at the same rate.247 In other words, why must
Pennsylvania’s energy sector constrain itself while others continue
as they have for the last century? As the United States Supreme
Court explained in Massachusetts v. EPA, the fact that others
continue to emit GHGs does not render attempts to limit emissions
meaningless.248 Further, in Pennsylvania’s case, the Commonwealth
has a constitutional duty to take such steps, regardless of what
other states are doing.249 Even more importantly, a majority of
Pennsylvanians believe that carbon emissions should be regulated
and that their state government should set emissions limits on coal-
fired power plants.250 The Commonwealth therefore has both a clear
mandate from its constituents and a constitutional duty to take
action against climate change, regardless of the course of action
other states take.251
246. See id. at 109-10 (discussing the challenges of finding support with higher allowance
prices).
247. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 523-25 (2007).
248. Id. at 524.
249. See supra Part II.B.
250. Jennifer Marlon, Peter Howe, Matto Mildenberger, Anthony Leiserowitz & Xinran
Wang, Pennsylvania, Yale Climate Change Opinion Maps 2020, YALE PROGRAM ON CLIMATE
CHANGE COMMC’N (Sept. 2, 2020), https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-
data/ycom-us/ [https://perma.cc/VN3G-5ZDX] (select “Pennsylvania” from the “Select a State”
dropdown menu).
251. It is important to note, however, that an issue referred to as “emissions leakage”
means that the extent to which neighboring states regulate their emissions can, to some
extent, limit the efficacy of cap and trade programs. For the purpose of this Note, the
following example provides a sufficient explanation of emissions leakage: Rather than
subjecting themselves to stricter emissions regulations and the associated costs in
Pennsylvania, a power plant might decide to relocate to a jurisdiction with fewer regulations
where the power plant could produce the same, if not a higher, level of emissions. Though the
relocation would result in lower emissions in Pennsylvania, the increase in emissions
elsewhere would create a net neutral result. However, RGGI and other cap and trade
programs have taken steps to limit carbon leakage. Offsets, REG.GREENHOUSE GASINITIATIVE,
https://www.rggi.org/allowance-tracking/offsets [https://perma.cc/HEV3-YS76]. For a detailed
analysis of the problems posed by, and solutions to, emissions leakage, see SHERYL L.
MUSGROVE, GEORDI A. TAYLOR, RADINA R. VALOVA & KARL R. RÁBAGO, PACE ENERGY &
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CONCLUSION
Over the last decade, Pennsylvania courts have breathed new life
into the Environmental Rights Amendment, making it a powerful
weapon that both allows individuals to enforce their environmental
rights and imposes particular fiduciary duties on the Common-
wealth.252 Governor Wolf ’s executive order mandating the imple-
mentation of an emissions reduction scheme is a critical step in
tackling climate change and in fulfilling the Commonwealth’s
constitutional duties.253 As Pennsylvania carries out the executive
order, it must look to the ERA for meaningful guidance or risk
running afoul of its constitutional mandate.
Climate change is a global crisis that will require a concerted
effort from around the world to properly combat it. While no country
or state can sufficiently wage war on climate change on their own,
they cannot sit idly by, waiting for the rest of the world to act.
Pennsylvania provides a powerful example of how actors at the
subnational level can leverage their unique constitutional and
statutory schemes to enforce environmental rights and combat
climate change.
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